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KlAUS KRIPPENDORFF

Transcending
Semiotics
TOWARDS UNDERSTANDING
DESIGN FOR UNDERSTANDING

Introduction

•n this paper I intend to examine several espistemoiogical

l

difficulties one quite naturally encounters within
traditional semiotics, especially when trying to
apply it to. design (industrial design and product
semantics 1 in particular).
Whenever a discipline encounters intellectual
challenges that it cannot respond to in terms of its
own standard practices, it can either exorcise them
and withdraw into a smaller domain of increasingly
refined but narrow applications, or it can expand its
conceptual horizon and embrace these challenges
with the prospect of thereby losing its own identity.

I prefer the latter. My plan therefore is to remove
those assumptions that lead to untenable semiotic
. practices, practices that prevent semiotics from participating in solving contemporary social problems,
and develop from what remains an alternative approach to the study of meaning in the broadest
sense, an approach that can more readily cope with
certain intellectual challenges emerging from a variety of scholarly and practical endeavors.
Seeking to understand meaning generally and the
meaning of designed objects particularly, we are
invariably lead to a point at which we have to make

a critical choice between two alternative paths of
understanding (things). The well-trodden path is
called objectivism. I will call the other constructivism. Without denying that there are various
shades of objectivism and various shades of constructivism2, just as there also are many variations
in approaches to semiotics, I do believe the two
paths are epistemologically incommensurable and
lead to significantly different social practices.

ently of it seems so obviously true. Oddly, it is the
practice of designing meaningful objects that might
constitute a sufficiently strong challenge of mainstream semiotics' received ontology.

Consfl·uctivism, the way I see it, takes reality as
residing neither somewhere outside or independent
of its human observer, of which objectivists are
unshakably convinced, nor inside an imagining
human mind, as solipsists hold true, but as arising
within the circular process of perception and action
or of conceiving and malting things, in other
words, in practice or in social practice when other
humans are as well involved.

Roughly, objectivism entails a commitment to the
belief in a reality that possesses observer- or cultureindependent structures, objects, codes and laws
waiting to be discovered, enciphered and described.
For objectivists, humans are plagued by observational biases, inadequacies, illusions and metaphysical beliefs that scientific observers seek to overcome

Consider walking on a beach. We feel the sand
between our toes and several inches beneath our
feet and soon come to know properties we could
not see before we stepped on (or into) it: the
softness, the warmth, the sound it makes walking.
What objectivists must describe as a reflection from
the yellow spectrum of the sunlight becomes for the
constructivist meaningful and alive thought
individual and multisensory participation. If we
cut us once on a piece of glass buried beneath the
sand's surface, we are inclined to see glass everywhere and walk accordingly. Understanding has
nothing to do with the physics of sensation. It
penetrates the visual surfaces of something deep
into its interior. It creates a reality on which we
act, a reality that becomes manifest in practice.

in order to obtain increasingly accurate accounts of

the one universe that exists outside of them.
Objective knowledge is representative of what exists
and the criterion for accepting a proposition as
(empirically) valid is truth by correspondence.'
I am suggesting that the mainstream of semiotic
scholarship is deeply rooted in the kind of objectivism just described. This already is evident in its
foundational concept: the sign. For something to
be a sign, there must be a (physically existing) signvehicle and what it carries, its meaning, a proposition and what it is about, a symbol and what it
stands for, or an artifact and what it expresses. Not
only is the essential connection between the two
domains presumed discoverable, identifiable,
describable and, hence, residing outside the
observing semiotician, the product of scientific
practice, here semiotic theory, is conceived descriptive of an objective reality as well. I suspect this
commitment to objectivism runs so deep that many
semiotically informed readers of this paper may not
find anything objectionable in this view. Talting
language to refer to something that exists independ-

OBJECTI ANO IMAGES

Consider the notion of a gift. We give all kinds of
things all the time,'whether as part of the role we
are assuming, in exchange for money or in the
expectation of a future benefit. However, what
constitutes a gift is carefully negotiated between
givers, recipients and third parties or judges not to
be confused with a bribe, an insult, a burden, an
obligation or aid. Objectivists will have a hard time
to find the references for what appears to be a
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meaningful gift. Constructivists would consider
the notion of a gift as a social construction that
arises out of and in turn participates in particular
social practices (of giving things).

of participating individuals. Understanding is far
from static. We might approach a new product
with curiosity but always handle it as a vatiation from
what we already know and what we want it to be.

Key to the constructivist approach is not an
objective reality but understanding. An axiom of
constructivism is that, excepting purely autonomous biological functions and involuntary behavior, individuals cannot see physical stimuli, much
less respond td them. They do not act on information from the outside, not even on affordances
designed into artifacts by others, but they do
behave according to their own understanding of
their own experiences, whether this concerns the
highly personal construction of sand on the beach
or the social construction of a gift. Taking "understanding" literally suggests that it stands beneath or
grounds reality in the social practice of people
living together. Social practice simply becomes an
unfolding of the constructions in the understanding

Radical constructivists moreover apply the propositions they make about others to themselves and
consequently see their very own probing into
meaning as a social practice arising in their own understanding critically involving the construction of
similarly capable others.

Figure I.

Map oftheTwo Paths

Leaving this introduction behind, I will now
explore the two alternatives. Let me first proceed
along the well known road of mainstream and, as I
claim, objectivst semiotics until some of its entailments come in sight and then retract to proceed on
the path less travelled, sketching the conceptual
milestones I see there in passing. Figure I serves as
a map of this effort.
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Lack of self-reflexion

The usual road of mainstream
semiotics' objectivism

(3) that the semioticians offering descriptive accounts of their observations in these three areas of
inquiry, their own discourse, their intellectual concerns and historical or cultural backgrounds, nowhere enters the semiotic project. Like gods, semioticians keep themselves outside their object of interest. This indeed is a textbook example of objectivism at work.

ased on the fam~us semiotic triangle whose corners are
occupied by sign-vehicle, designatum and interpretant, by utterance, meaning and concept or by related tri-partitions favoured by individual semioticians, Morris' division of the semioticians' labor
into syntax, semantics and pragmatics (Morris,
1938) is widely accepted as evident in encyclopedias
and dictionaries (e.g. Sebeok, 1986). Let me state
their definitions for the sake of laying the ground:

b

Allow me to reframe the three areas of semiotic
studies to make the nature of the implied objectivism more transparent. Evidently:

8 Symax is the description ofa reality in which
humans do not exist or are not allowed to enter.
Compositions, forms, systems and texts are
presumed to have their own syntax which semioticians study and discover, whatever their origin,
basis or purpose may be. Geometry, grammar,
composition rules and mathematics are typical
languages for syntactical descriptions of signvehicles, but none provide in them a place for their
human creators, users or observers:'

8 Syntax is the study of the relations between signvehicles (to which some physical existence is
ascribed),

8 Semantics is the study of the relations between
sign-vehicles and their designata, particularly the
objects which they may or do denote, their
referents,
8 Pragmatics is the study of the relations between
signs and their users and includes in its domain all
the psychological, biological, and sociological
phenomena that occur in the functioning of signs.

8 Semantics is the description ofa reality in which
all humans (within a community) are the same and
can rl1erefore be ignored. This is already manifest
in accepting claims of the rather common form
"something means or refers to something other
than itself' or "something is a symbol or a substitute for something else," either of which may be
said to be part of an existing code. Notwithstanding the acknowledgement that some of the semantic relations or codes are established by convention,
legislated by authority or, in the case of symptoms,
as having to be discovered in nature and learned to
be acted upon, describing them without references
to human cognition presupposes that semantic
relations or codes exist independent of their
creators and users and outside of whoever accounts
for them. This objectification divorces meanings

Although these definitions appear obvious and
innocent, I am suggesting that they exemplifY a
vocabulary that drives semioticians, possibly quite
unknowingly, along the objectivist road. Notice in
these definitions (1) that they presume an embedded hierarchy whose base rests upon the materiality
of sign-vehicles that become signs by virtue of their
non-physical, grammatical, semantic and pragmatic
ways of functioning; (2) that the various relations
being studied here, whether these are based on
resemblances, natural laws, or conventions, are
presumed to actually exist independent of describing them, descriptions being viewed as representative or a reflection of the relations as observed, and
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Its intellectual imperialism. In a recent and
unfortunately rather naive article in Fonn, Uri
Friedlander (1989), a designer by trade and probably quite unaware of the epistemology he was
tampering with, tried to drag product semantics
along the very objectivist road it had deviated from
by accounting for the meaning of artifacts without
any concern for either individual cognition or the social
practices of users or designers.
To support his contention,
that product semantics was
already known during the
stone age, he presented several
images of artifacts. Two
examples are reproduced in
figure 2 respectively captioned
"bronze handle" of a door with
the comment the lion as
symbol of protection. Roman
100-300 AD" and "cosmetic
spoon. The lion and the eagle
as guardian angel of
beauty... Egypt 1250 BC."

from the very "somebody" that Charles S. Peirce, in
his definition of sign, made responsible for something to be meaningful. Except for confining
semantic descriptions to a speech community or
culture, humans turn out to be irrelevant in such
objectivist accounts of meaning. Finally:
CD Pragmatics is the description ofhow humans
respond to a reality that is the same for everyone
(within a community). Studying "the uses of signs"
presumes knowing the signs whose use is being investigated. Inquiring into "the interpretation of a
tex( presumes the existence of a text that is knowa~
ble and independent of its interpretation. By packing into pragmatics all the biological, psychological,
sociological and political aspects of signs presumes a
non-biological, non-psychological, non-sociological
and non-political realm of existence in which signs,
their syntax and semantics reside unaffected by
their use. Objectivist pragmatics (which almost is a
contradiction in terms) here admits individual variation, whether due to biases, incompetencies, misunderstandings or interests, but always in response
to or in the use of a common reality, a universe of
shared signs, symbols or meanings that are the same
for everybody. -How else could one establish biases, incompetencies and misunderstandings but by
reference to a standard reality, a known universe
common to all?

I(

Notwithstanding his rather careless confusion of
ages, one is compelled to ask: How does
Friedlander know what these artifacts meant? How
can he possibly speak for what people had in mind
thousands of years ago? Does he have any evidence
about how the artifact now called "cosmetic spoon"
was perceived, talked about and used by ancient
Egyptians? Were there guardian angels? Was the
owner of the house with such a bronze handle really
so insecure that he or she needed the image of a
lion for protection? And did it work?

One may not like this characterization of semiotics,
but I suggest it fairly accurately describes mainstream semiotics' epistemological assumptions as
manifest in its vocabulary and linguistic practices.
Let me elaborate on five entailments of objectivist
semiotics, its intellectual imperialism, its predisposition for standardization, it dualism, its paradoxes
and inconsistencies, and its lack of self-reference.
An example might illustrate where this road
takes us.

2

Let me propose that any assertion of what something means speaks foremost for the speaker, here a
1989 Friedlander. A statement of what something
means to someone else is far more difficult to

8

substantiate. If we happen to find something
interesting and meaningful to warrant joint
attention or if we see it as a sign of something else,
then this takes place in our own contemporary
culture, in our own living language and in the

own world and maximally, it is an act of oppressing
the views of other cultures, ethnic minorities and
the less privileged, ruling their identity out of
existence to the benefit of the semioticians' own
position of authority.

presence of our own cognition. 01,1r own and

always contemporary perception provides us with
no indication of how the ancient maker or users of
an artifact saw what we see or was conscious of
what we now take for granted. As a discipline,
semiotics is about a hundred years old. Its name is
said to have been coined by John Locke in 16905
and the awareness of a relationship between sound
and meaning has been traced no further than to
Plato's dialogues (Cratylus). No doubt, people
talked long before they knew they did, but there is
no evidence that the creators of the cave paintings
oflascaux, for a stone age example, had any
notions resembling ours, least of all of product
semantics. The claim that one's own perceptions
equal those of everyone else, past and future, here
and everywhere is an ethnocentrism, or better still,
an intellectual imperialism we ought not to tolerate
in our midst and certainly not clothe in scientific
terms.

Since there is no easy test for the sharing of
perceptions among contemporaries and much less
across cultures and ages) an objectivist discourse on
meaning that generates assertions like "the lion is a
symbol of protection" (without qualifYing for
whom, when and in what circumstances), implying
that everyone must be able to see what so obviously
and objectively "exists", claims unquestionable hegemony over the discourses of others. The
publication of Friedlander's therewith expressed
views implicitly supports the imperialist claims of
mainstream semiotics. Even modern market
researchers would discredit themselves by not
qualifYing accounts of the meanings of products.

Its predisposition for standardization, If I
were to see a door with a ring held in place by what
resembles to me a lion's teeth, I could invent
numerous equally plausible explanations ranging
from the reputed strength of a lion's teeth (the conviction "a lion will not surrender his prey" maybe
an analogue to "the ring can't be pulled out") to
that it might be the original home of a traveller,
hunter or lion tamer. Collectively we might come
up with many more explanations than I can
imagine and there is no guarantee that what we can
come up with has anything to do with why an
ancient craftsman made the door handle in that
image, why the house's tenant put it on his or her
door and what it meant to those having to handle
it. In view of such possible variations of meanings,
the objectivist road Friedlander is taking here by
asserting, with the authority of an expert, that the
lion is a symbol of protection blinds him and his
readers from recognizing cultural diversity.

I an1 suggesting that the intellectual imperialism in
the above is the consequence of a vocabulary that
drives mainstream semioticians to confuse their
discourse and their way of seeing with the objectivity of the things seen or talked about and constructs
a single, objective and coherent universe in which
humans either play no role (in the case of syntax) or
are so alike (in the case of objectivist semantics)
that their nature does not matter. The imperialists'
language here becomes privileged, universal and
transparent. This imperialism does not kill people
or capture territory (although such could become
its consequence). Minimally, it is an act of disrespect for the cognitive autonomy of other individuals, their ability to make their own sense of their

OBJECTS AND IHAGES
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increasing material abundance, to the availability of
new technologies, to widespread democratization of
culture or to post-modern attitudes, standardization
for the sake of theory is increasingly seen as
oppressive. For example, personal computers were
developed with the explicit intent to counter what
was then perceived as a tendency towards centralization of intelligence. This new technology was
envisioned as cheap and hence affordable by many,
able to undermine hierarchies by supporting networking, negotiation and communication, and
freely configurable, thus enabling individuals to
organize their own worlds according to their own
conceptions and desires. The computer revolution
we now experience attests to the value of this individualization and the importance of a motivation
that derives from interacting with a technology that
is engaging, playful and fun and from the ability to
create meanings and construct individual worlds in
the process. Standardization of user interfaces, the
rational submission to predefined functionalities
and the conformity of use, has driven even large
scale computer manufacturers out of business. I am
suggesting that a discipline, a theory or a discourse
whose normative implications are contradicted by
so many contemporary experiences becomes nonviable in the long run.

The semiotic view of communication as exchanging
signs chosen from a common repertoire or as using
a common code for translating sign-vehicles into
their corresponding designata (or representations
thereof) elevates the objectivists' disrespect for
cultural diversity and individual autonomy to a
theoretically motivated social norm. In this view,
only the sharing of meanings, only the invariability
of encoding and decoding processes, only the sameness of the senders' and receivers' processing
equipment makes communication and by implication society possible. Accordingly, if the image of a
lion would not mean the same for everyone it could
not induce the fear necessary to deter thieves or
offer protection against disasters, just as a message
that does not point everyone to the same referent
could not have generalizable effects. In this
objectivist view, the standardization of signs, their
meanings and their use, is a prerequisite of understanding, communication and social orderliness.

·I

It is therefore not surprising that Friedlander is
driven to the very same conclusion, calling for the
search and use by designers of"culture-independent
symbols," implying that they could exist everywhere and for everyone alike. In the same vein, the
call for papers for the design section a recent
congress on semiotics' of laments the lack of
uniformity in human-product relationships and
warns against a new "Babylonian confusion'' in the
design of computer interfaces, especially in the
icons used for manipulating computer screens.
Undoubtedly, there occasionally are good reasons
for inventing and institutionally enforcing standardized symbol systems, for example, public traffic
signs, whose ability to coordinate human behavior
benefits all participants. But such examples are few.

Its inherent dualism. The Cartesian dualism is
fundamental to all kinds of objectivisms and
naturally at home in mainstream semiotics. This is
evident in the foundational distinction between the
world of signs, symbols and linguistic expressions
and the world of unlabeled objects and observerindependently existing physical events. The former
possess the ability to mean, refer to, substitute for,
represent or describe the latter, but not the other
way around. The two worlds are construed as
being governed by different laws, the semiotic rules
or codes, and the natural (prototypically physical
but also including biological, psychological and

In design, standardization has always supported
mass production for mass consumers and enabled
mass control. In contrast, whether this is due to an
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indicators to an electronic device to make it appear

some would even add sociological) laws. The
semiotic dualism replicates the stereotypical
distinction between culture and nature or between
mind and matter and is sometimes rationalized in
philosophical realism.

more sophisticated, valuable or in style than it is,
(3) substituting cheaper materials while maintaining
traditionally valued appearances, like pressing Navaho jewelery out of plastic, or (4) associating them
with prestigious individuals, designers, prominent
figures that the users are made to believe they could
emulate.

This dualism is not a mere philosophical issue. In
the design of industrial products, for example, it
assigns product meanings and product functionalities or materialities to distinct phenomenal domains
an thereby promotes a particularly suspect design
practice. It makes semiotic practitioners, like
Friedlander, to talk about the meaning of a door
handle as if the door handle were an object that
could exist without meaning (for anyone) and to
which some meaning could mysteriously be
attached (by its designer). Accordingly, it becomes
natural for semioticians to look for that additional
feature in the inessential aspects of form, the image
of a lion's head, for example, implying that without
some such feature the door handle would have to
be without meaning or meaningless and moreover,
that the perceiving and being able to handle what
the word "door handle" designates has nothing to
do with its meaning.

Instead of seeking to understand how something
comes to be meaningful in users' minds and to
enable this process through informed product
design, the dualism implied in the semiotic
vocabulary, conveniently embraced by the rhetoric
of advertisement, creates a make belief world of
deceptive symbolisms behind which lack of
understanding, alienation and frustration necessarily lingers.

Its absurdities and contradictions. For one
example, the dualism just assessed for its practical
implications also leads to strange contradictions. If
one insists on distinguishing between a realm in
which natural laws govern physical events independent of human observation and a realm
consisting of semiotic phenomena, signs, symbols
and linguistic expressions which seemingly are the
products of human consciousness, how can
mainstream semioticians justify studying their
empirical domain from the very same removed and
outsider's perspective that physicists employ to
inquire into theirs? How can one simultaneously
claim semiosis to be a phenomenon of human
consciousness and yet describe it as if humans
either did not exist, have nothing to do with it or
variously use what is considered same for everyone?
Doesn't this kind of semiotics conceptually undermine its own premise.

Helen Karmasin 7, representing a marketing view of
product semantics, is guided by the very same
dualist conceptions, conceiving meaning as a value
adding feature of consumer products. I am far
from denying what I see as her main point, that
designers' awareness of semantics can improve
products' marketability and use. I merely wish to
point out that the dualism mainstream semiotics
supports encourages the design of products that are
thought to acquire values and meanings by (I)

imitating (representing or symbolizin/Y something else
that has inherently nothing to do with them, like a
telephone in the shape of a duck decoy, (2) adding
symbols of value from another semantic domain,
like non-functional bottoms, dials and frequency

OBJECTS AND IMAGES

Consider another example. Ulrich Neisser (1976),
after conducting numerous experiments, concluded
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objects of design can be seen in the same semiotically paradoxical state. Saying that something, a
unicorn) Gotham City> a spoon or a stone, for that
matter, refers to itself is just an effort to save a
misguiding objectivism by attributing actor status
to objects. Things, like unicorns, are what they
mean to us in our experience neither because a
theory tells us which experiences are legitimate
(even so semiotics may just try to do this in its own
domain) nor because the things have the intention
to represent themselves in ways they do.

that we do not see things but meanings. James
Gibson (1979, 1982), before him said much the
same by suggesting that we do not percei':e objects
but affordances. Gestalt psychologists build their
approach on the experimentally verifiable experiences that we cannot identify absolute sounds but
contrasts between them, melodies for example, that
we recognize figures only against a ground, in other
words, that an observer-independent physics of sensory impressions has little to say about what and
how we see. !manuel Kant, long ago, concluded:
things as such are constitutionally inaccessible to
us. Obviously, one cannot simultaneously claim
that we only see meanings and that an object
(which we would have to be able to distinguish and
identify as such without its meaning) has (or conveys) meanings without either running into serious
contradictions or claiming that semioticians are in
the privileged position of god-like observers
superior to everyone else. One is led to ask: what
would happen to a semiotics in which the signvehicles, stimuli or artifacts on one edge of the semiotic triangle are taken to be as I think they are constitutively inaccessible to human observers?

...

.

Its Inability of self-reflexlon. Let me conclude
my criticism by pointing to what might underlie all
four of the difficulties mentioned: mainstream
semioticians see the object of semiotic analysis, the
world of semiosis, as existing independent and
outside of their describing it. This sharp distinction between the semiosis as observed by a detached
semiotidan and what semioticians do in their own
work prevents semioticians from entering their own
empirical domain and makes their own theories
and empirical accounts of semiotic phenomena
immune to semiotic considerations. It also enables
them to deny responsibility for the very semiosis
their semiotic accounts may set in motion in those
addressed, in the phenomena being described,
including in their own cognition. In short,
mainstream semiotics is non-reflexive if not
authoritarian in consequence (in the sense of both
being unquestionably above and not caring for the
cognition of those affected by it). In stating this so
bluntly, I do not imply unethical intentions or
devious conduct, but, as I suggested earlier, that it
is the semiotic conceptualizations, vocabulary and
discourse that keeps semioticians on the well paved
road of a self-limiting objectivism.

Unicorns exemplify another class of semiotic
oddities. Unicorns, we know, do not exist. When
we see one we therefore must deny its status both as
real and as a pictorial representation of something
real. This lack of reference leads us to describe
unicorns with a syntactical language that cannot
but bring to bear on its description the kind of
experiences we have with the animals unicorns
remind as of, thus reintroducing the representational attributes just denied, A Hlm shot in the stage set
of a totally imaginary town is equally paradoxical.
The camera shoots something that is at once real
and imaginary, an original fake. Computer
generated images that represent nothing outside
that computer's own mode of operation pose
similar problems to semiotics and artifacts or

3

A brief example may add to what I already said. A
challenging paper by Antje Flade8 revealed gender
differences in what a home means to its inhabit-

2

ants. It found (please note that "finding" implies
that it was there before it was discovered and
unaffected by the act of describing it) that women
see in their home a place they identifY with, a place
of human contact, a place where they do their

are thereby prevented from understanding the selfreference of their own practice.
Without claiming to know the right way, I am
afraid, the objectivist road might lead to a "semiotized world" full of problems and contradictions
that may leave little space for alternatives and to
feel at home. Let me therefore retract from the
road commonly travelled to where a smaller path
branched of and continue in a radically different
direction.

chores, whereas men see in their home a place to

withdraw after work, view television and relax, a
place to play with kids and be with friends and a
place to keep one's material possessions. It also
concluded that most home layouts were created by
male architects and afforded men's home uses more
so than women's. Notwithstanding that the very
act of asking these questions may have made
interviewees aware of the phenomenon being
addressed, notwithstanding also the preference of
scientific "findings" to emphasize large frequencies
(majorities), commonalties and averages at the
expense of exceptions or deviations from main
findings, when such scientific reports become
instructions to architects to develop layouts appropriate to women's ((needs", then past sexual
stereotypes are being reinforced, establish themselves as norms and become built into the solid
layouts of a home whose "forcing functions" might
make it less and less possible for women to escape.

The trail worth blazing: towards a
constructivist semantics

l• have to be brief now. Let me therefore demand,
foremost of myself and with implicit justification
taken from the preceding, that:
I

any semantic theory may construct.

II

My understanding and, hence, also the

semantics I am concerned with here, must embrace

Obviously, even innocent descriptions never are
entirely neutral. The semiosis that Flade's insightful "report" encourages has the potential of unintentionally reinforcing the appalling sexual stereotypes whose observation motivated the study. A
lesson of this example could be to report not the
facts as "found" but what this study could give rise
to when embodied in the practice of living in
architectural spaces. It serves here as an adequate
demonstration that semioticians, through their
inquiries into the meanings of others, are themselves involved in a semiosis that constructs and
hence changes the very reality they seek to describe
so innocently. Objectivists are committed to
render nothing other than accurate descriptions and

OBJECTS AND IMAGES

Semantics, as a theoretical discourse on

meaning, be embedded in human understanding as
a recursive cognitive process. Humans should be
recognized as constitutive participants in the worlds

(leave space for and take account oO others' understanding of the social practices through which we
might be concerned with each other. Semantics
arises out of social practices, informs them in return
and therefore must be valid for observers and for
observed others alike.
III
On the premise that understanding always is
someone's self-reflective achievement and never finished as such, semantics should be creative and constructive of further understanding and enable the
construction of coherent worlds, the design of
meaningful artifacts and discourse presumed
understandable by others included.

3
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I
It would follow that such a semantics must spell
out the cognitive operations of understanding it is
intrinsically concerned with. It should not designate a class of objects of interest, for example signs,
but the cognitive processes that brings them into
being. Let me mention a few processes a constructivist semantics should embrace.

Understanding

t

II

o me, understanding is a recursive process of constructing
(deconstructing, reconstructing and inventing)
(reality) constructions whose cognitive unfolding
(into various practices, interventions and actions)
preserves the very process of construction within
the experiences of its embodiment. Let me
elaborate on some of its properties.
Understanding is a cognitively autonomous
process. It arises within individual cognition. It is
personal and private. It can be neither transmitted
to someone else nor imposed from the outside.
(Any uinfluence" is a matter of one's own causal
constructions on how different experiences are
connected, how one chooses to explain them).
Understanding is not ofsomething outside, understanding is, ongoing, a process. The eigenvalue of
understanding (where the process converges to with
time) may be the feeling that one's reality constructions are coherent, sufficiently complete and viable
in practice.
Understanding is a recursive process. As such it
builds on its own products, piles explanations on
top of explanations, continuously decomposes,
reconstructs, elaborates and transforms the constructions already there, weaving concurrent experience into them. "Original" or "raw'' experiences,
which are hardly accessible as such, recede with
time in their importance for directing the process.

Understanding is a creative and constructive undertaking. Reality constructions therefore happen by
invention, not by necessity. This is far from saying
that understanding is arbitrary. Understanding directs its own history and is constrained by experiences arising from its unfolding constructions into
(social) practices and by contingencies (perturbations) from its embodiment. It is within these constraints that its artifacts may arise spontaneously.
If understanding were structure-determined and individuals would therefore have no choice in how
they construct their realities, a sense of self could
not arise and nobody could be held responsible for
their actions. If understanding were totally arbitrary, wit\lOut a viability check, individuals would
have to be solipsists and as such unable to respect,
live and communicate with others like them. Thus,
the notion of understanding here proposed may be
nothing more than acreative perpetuation of socially viable constructions.

Understanding defines its own horizon. What is
within seems coherent and meaningful, what is beyond escapes comprehension (or may not be seen at
all). The horizon may expand, of course, with experiences and in time, but only from within. For
exan1ple, as it directs its own history, understanding
also provides the passing contexts (of reality
constructions) for perturbations to enter. However,
the causes of these experiences cannot be known
outside of understanding or constructing themwhich would keep them inside that horizon. For
any one individual, there can therefore be no reality, no (social) practice independent of his or her
understanding.
Understanding dedicates all of its processes, all of
its resulting reality constructions (including the
construction of an observing self, others, a physical
world and its horizon) to the preservation of understanding (coincidentally including its embodiment,

for example, in the medium of a biological system
which may remain unknown as such). One could
also say, the purpose of understanding is to sustaining itself in the face of perturbations arising from
its embodiment.' Alternatively, it could be said
that cognitive systems are constituted or constitute
themselves to sustain their recursive understanding
including themselves. Or, as Spencer-Brown concluded, "we cannot escape the fact that the world
we know is constructed in order (and thus in such a
way as to be able) to see itself' (1972, p.105).

Position

t

he distinction between my understanding and my ef-

Understanding and (social) practice belong to different phenomenal domains, to different realities.
Anyone's (participation in social) practice is inseparably fused and hence indistinguishable from his or
her own self-understanding. Observing and seeking
to understand the practices in which others participate involves seeking to understand the understanding by others. One's own understanding and someone else's understanding have different embodiments and therefore belong to different realities.
Particularly in the social domain, understanding
embraces different realities (or variously embodied
reality constructions).

Objectivist knowledge is positionless. Indeed, the
belief in the existence of a single reality outside its
observer, a universe, which is the same for everyone, renders alternative positions meaningless.
What is seen then is projected onto this outside
reality for which no one can be held responsible
except for having to accurately describe it. In this
belief, alternative forms of understanding become
human failures or distortions of reality.

Social practices, coordinations, institutions and
other artifacts are correlates of the cognitive unfolding of simultaneously active reality constructions.
"Correlates)) because they may reach into and involve the participation of others, but what anyone
knows or what anyone knowingly acts upon always
resides inside his or her own understanding.

Minimally, positions are evident in our describing
what we see (the people in our lives or the artifacts
we handle) relative to our body. Someone is a
father, an employee or an idol to me or to someone
else but not necessarily to both. "Hard" and "soft"
are defined relative to our experiences of touch.
Whether we talk about people or computers, either
has a front, facing us, and a back, facing away from
us. And when we describe the functionality of

With this understanding of understanding in mind,
let me develop a few concepts for a constructivist
semantics.

OBJECTS AND IMAGES

fort to understand a social practice in terms of
someone else's understanding gives rise to different
positions one may take within one's own reality
constructions. For example, in communication
research, one may want to distinguish between the
position of the author and the positions of different
kinds of readers vis-a-vis that of the communication
researcher who links both through a text. The text
may be something entirely different for each. To
capture this difference (without privileging one's
own reading as right and evetyone else's as wrong
or biased in degrees) requires the ability to take
different positions. T airing different positions from
which to construct and see something that may
appear to us to be the same for everybody enables
choices among alternative constructions of reality
and accordingly requires talting responsibilities for
constructing them.

3

5

artifacts we refer to what we are able or unable to
do with them, whether they help or hinder us.
Thus, our self is intricately involved in how we see
even the most elementary things. Helga and HansJtirgen Lannoch (1989) used this natural selfreference in ordinary language descriptions of form
to argue for a non-geometric notion of space that
includes the position of the observer.

what something means for others constitutes a relationship between constructions on different logical
levels: our understanding and our construction of
someone else's understanding. It entails that we acknowledge our own position from which we see {or
understand) and to construct from this vety position the positions of others from which we have
reasons to suspect they see {or understand) differently. In a constructivist semantics taking positions
and appreciating (by construction) the positions
others take is critical.

The situation is more complicated when we have
reasons to believe that what we are seeing from our
position has positions of its own and different from
us, when we do not merely observe but observe the
observing by others. This is the key to understanding human communication. In human communication, the cognitive autonomy of others, including
their ability to choose positions of their own must
be mutually respected else interaction ceases to be
social and reduces to manipulating others as tools.

I might add here in passing a distinction, proposed
elsewhere (Krippendorff, 1990b) among three
kinds of positions, that of a becomer, of an observer
and of a subject. In the area of semantics, becomers
realize their own semiosis and are involved in a
continuous process of self-realization. Becomers are
aware of malting themselves at home in their own
understanding. Observers are aware of their ability
to construct and reconstruct signs, symbols and
artifacts outside themselves but not that this could
apply to their own position and to themselves. Designers are prone to talting this position. Subjecrs
see themselves as having to adapt and therefore
willingly subject themselves to realities constructed
as residing outside their participation and control,
for example, to fixed meanings, unquestionable
linguistic conventions, unalterable social
institutions and super-individual powers. Subjects
allow themselves to be oppressed by how they
choose to see.

However, I do not want to get into issues of
communication here. Instead, I want to elaborate
on the earlier question of what it takes to understand someone else's meaning {of something),
which is the prototypical question semantic
analyses should answer. If we say we see only
meanings, as Neisser suggests, or affordances, as
Gibson claims, or the experiential consequences of
the embodiments of our own reality constructions,
then such positionless statements as "the lion is a
symbol of protection,'' ((red means danger or "the
airodynamic shape of a car indicates its speed"
would not make sense without knowing who is
talking. {For this reason, I argued that
Ftiedlander's promulgations are Friedlander's account of Friedlander's perceptions, unjustifiably
projected onto everybody else). As soon as we
speak about others with cognitive capabilities similar to our own then we can no longer insist that
others respond to how we see things. We have to
respect their own understanding. Thus, asserting
11
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The ability to take positions is fundamental to
understanding ones own understanding. The
ability to construct the positions of others is
fundamental to understanding social practices. A
constructivist semantics has to explain the differences created in talting different positions and in
this difference might lie the fundamental notion of
a sign.

6

into a battleground. Whereas a medical metaphor

Metaphor

entails treatment and care for the diseased, the war

0 bjectivists have little analytical use for metaphors,

metaphor entails a distinction between friends and
foes, brings forth and mobilizes resources to fight
the enemy, justifies even the invasion of another
country, Panama as it were, calls for personal
sacrifices, winning or losing being the only outcomes. Metaphors are not true or false. They
organize perceptions and actions through their

variously describing them syntactically as literary
figures of speech, semantically as malting vague or
allusory references and pragmatically as forms of
poetic embellishment and all along blaming them
for inconclusive thinking. To me, metaphors,
while manifest in certain linguistic figures or visual
forms, reflect a very precious cognitive operation.
Metaphors seem vague and uncertain only when
one is destined to look for referents outside
cognition.

terms.

Another example is the shape of personal computers. There is no natural form. The boxes of a mainframe computer are as good as the human figure of
a fictional robot. Since the working of a computer
is understandable only to very few, it is not surprising that personal computers assumed the shape of
two familiar technologies, the TV screen for seeing
and the keys of a typewriter for inputting. These
two metaphors provided an initial understanding of

Roughly, "metaphors make us see one thing in
terms of another" (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980;
Lakoff, 1987). They become manifest in changing
our perceptions. More specifically, there always are
(1) two distinct domains of experiences, (2) a structure, pattern or principle of construction is transferred or carried from one (and usually well understood) domain into another (and usually inadequately understood) domain which it thereby (3)
organizes in ways not experienced or seen without
this import. The latter involves fitting existing
parts from the target domain into new wholes.
Once the imported structure makes sense (4) metaphors serve as a bridge for bringing a variety of additional entailments to the target domain. Two examples will suffice.

computation in terms of what was well known in

entirely different domains. However, they also
drove their evolution. The first PC's had line
screens. The user saw his or her outputs not much
different from how it came out ofa typewriter, line
by line and moving up the screen. But TV also
shows colors which were added to computers as a
matter of course. TV alsohas moving images and
sound which are now being realized in various
hyper-card applications. So, the entailments of the
TV metaphor drives computer development within
the horizon of understandability.

People use all kinds of nonprescription drugs for all
kinds of reasons. In the U.S., the complex web of
motivations for drug production, dissemination
and use is increasingly understood through war
metaphors. Although there are other ways of
understanding drug use, for example, as a disease
(medical metaphor), as a community or educational
issue (social metaphor) or as criminal behavior
(legal metaphor), accounts of"the war on drugs" by
politicians, the media and ordinary folks make it
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From the point of view of a constructivist semantics, metaphors are far from representations that are
plagued by referential ambiguity and falsehood.
Underlying their linguistic expression are rather
definite cognitive operations that create new perceptions and organize actions, render meaningful
what heretofore was incomprehensible and constitute new realities we thereafter observe with surptis-
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argued that design is making sense (ofthings) (Krippendorff, 1989, 1990a). It calls for designing
meaningful things, artifacts whose workings are
understandable in particular contexts and by prospective users.

ing certainty. .N[etaphors reflect a cognitive process
that creates new meanings.

Metonymy: sense and function

II.

II :
.I

metonymy reflects the cognitive operation of relating
parts to wholes. It explains or overcomes the difference created by drawing a distinction between
something and wherein it resides, what it is a part
of, the background against which it comes to the
fore, for example, between inside and outside, between text and context, bet\veen an organism and
its environment and between the observer and the
observed. Clearly, neither wholes nor parts (which
are wholes in their own right) can exist without the
two cognitive operations of drawing part-whole
distinctions and making sense of what keeps the
thus created parts together. Elsewhere
(Krippendorff, 1988, 1990a), I suggested a
distinction between me:i'ning and sense, describing
them as the result of two different operations on
experiences. We say that something makes seme
when we understand the role it plays in a particular
context, when we have a metonymic understanding
of what we see it does. It makes sense that the
movement of a pen over paper leaves a mark. It
makes sense that a bolt holds two pieces of hardware together. In contrast, the meaning of something is the sum total of all the contexts for which
we are able to imagine a sense for it. My pen does
not just write, it can serve me in numerous capacities for example, to operate my computer wristwatch. In short, something means (or enables
someone to anticipate and see) its possible contexts of
use. Thus, by analogy, sense is to meaning as
actuality is to potentiality, as performance is to
competence (Chomsky) or as speech is to language
(Saussure). We acquire sense by perception and
action. We acquire meaning by grouping the many
senses we could make (of something) in different
settings into a recognizable class. I have frequencly
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Metonymy probably reflects the cognitive prerequisite of objectivist notions of sign. For example, for
a cause to become an index of its consequence (or
for a consequence to indicate its cause) presupposes
(1) drawing a distinction in time and in kind
between two events and (2) explaining the difference thus created in causal terms. Only after these
cognitive operations were performed on the initially
undifferentiated and whole experience, can one
event serve as an index of the absent other. Classical examples of metonymies are taking a crown as a
sign for a monarchy, using (the image oO a table
setting as the sign for a restaurant, making a logo
designate a corporation (e.g. by imprinting it on
every communication, building or product).
Helene Karmasin 10, gives several good examples of
efforts to change the definition of products by
presenting them in new contexts for TV viewers to
-make sense of, for example, deodorants in the
context of romantic success or expensive cat food in
the context of treating someone special, the cat, for
gi~ing invaluable companionship. The aim of this
form of advertising is to create metonymies that
encourage viewers to make sense that can be generalized to a belief in buying, not a mere chemical
that removes odors, but a means to interpersonal
success or not mere food to feed a cat but a way of
cultivating companionship.
Metonymy also underlies functional analyses,
ranging from the social sciences to engineering.
Sociology, for example, defines the function of an
individual act by how it contributes to the wellbeing (essential prerequisites) of a society. In social
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psychology, social roles are described by the function a person performs by virtue of holding an office, position or title within a social organization.
In systems theory, the function of a subsystem is
what it does relative to all other parts of the larger
system, mathematically expressed by an equation
relating inputs to outputs.
Being serious about the possibility of talting
different positions within one's own reality con~
structions, I am suggesting that a fimction is
nothing other than the disembodied sense something
makes in a professionally privileged context. "Disembodied" because it surrenders one's own position
to a virtual community or group defined by the
presumption of sharing a discourse, seeing alike or
malting the same sense of things. "Privileged" because the context in which functions arise is not
necessarily accessible to the experiences of the
uninitiated and the theory that informs what a
function is arises from what that professional
community considers desirable and real. In design,
the functional description of artifacts privileges the
metonymic constructions of professional designers.
Witness the frequent discussions about what a
product's functions should be and complaints
about users who do not use it as intended. In
semiotics, sign-functions privilege the metonymic
constructions of semioticians. All speech communities tend to privilege their own functional
discourses. For example, an AI engineer may
consider the functional architecture of a computer
as the only reality that counts and user conceptions
as secondary, subjective and unreal, whereas a user
may see that computer primarily as a device for
acquiring a competitive advantage over others,
rendering the senses made by others less important.
Similarly, when designers get excited about an
unusual artifact, their professional discourse
prevents them from analyzing their emotions and
instead places such an artifact in the context of
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socially established aesthetic theories which justify
arguing in terms of proportions, symmetries, repetitions, etc., not realizing that this way of seeing is
rather specialized to their profession.
Sense and functions arise out of the same metonymic processes but differ in the responsibilities
taken or refused for what is seen.
Polysemy: meanings and affordances

b

y accounting for meanings, for example, in terms of
contents of containers as in "X has the meaning of
'f' or in terms of correspondences as in "X
substitutes for Y/' objectivist semiotics favors oneto-one relationships. Dictionaries, catalogues of
symbols and codes describing such relationships are
witness to these preferences and when such one-toone descriptions cannot be achieved, contexts are
sought out as disambiguating agents. This is
merely an effort to rule out polysemy. Consider a
few examples of uses of the word "play:"
to play tennis
to play down an issue
to play something in someone else's hands
to play around with someone of the opposite sex
to play a game of chess
a play by Shakespeare
child's play
playboy magazine
a playboy
"play" plays different roles in different contexts
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Porsche the possibility of driving fast, impressing
someone else, etc. This is not to suggest that we always have in mind all the culturally conceivable cont~xts of use for what meets our senses, but that the
meaning ofsornething equals our present anticipation
ofwhat we could da with it, in which contexts it
would make sense to us. Meanings always are relative
to someone's circumstances of understanding.

In these examples, there seem to be few if any commonalties among the senses in which «play" decisively participates. It would therefore be difficult to
claim the word to have a core meaning that different contexts merely modifY (see synecdoche below).
"Play" simply is polysemous which is to say that it
can assume a range of roles in different situations.
The only constancy in these examples is the word
"play."

A concept closely related to this notion of meaning
is affordance. Gibson (1979, 1982) originally
coined the term to account for his observation that
pilots, seeking to land their aircraft, look for and see
in the surfaces they are exposed to not what it is but
whether an aircraft is "landable." He extended this
idea to perception in general, suggesting that
something becomes a chair because it is perceived as
affording sitting, that something becomes a cup
because it is seen as affording the containment of
fluids, etc. Gibson certainly was an objectivist or
realist as he described himself who believed that it is
the nature of the perceived object that provides information and does the affording. This led him to
disembodied accounts analogue to that of functions
as discussed above but, unlike the objectivism of his
period, his affordances clearly are anticipatory and
describe abilities or potentialities. Gibson's
affordances seem to be nothing but meanings except
that they are disowned by their beholders, projected
on a perceived environment outside of them, and
presumed shared by members of a {professional)
community of psychologists and designers, for
example. Thus, affordances are to meanings as
fimctions are to sense.

In view of the chamelion-like senses something can
make in different contexts, the semiotic ideal of
finding simple correspondences between signvehicles and what they refer to or mean, also
expressed in the apparent need for disambiguation,
may be a hopeless if not oppressive undertaking,
save for the most restricted semantic domains, for
example, traffic signs, legal terms, technical vocabulary, military ranks and dictionaries used in teaching. In fact, in all of the latter examples there are
institutional reasons for forcing unambiguous
use. What is needed here is some kind of field
theory of meaning.
In the preceding, I defined sense as an explanation
of what something is seen as actually daing in a
particular context of experiences, the role it plays
for someone, and meanings as the roles something
could play or what it could be made to da in a range
of imaginable contexts. So, a pen is not just an
instrument for writing. It can also be a pointer, a
stylus, a projectile, a book mark, a reason for holes
in one's pocket, a fingernail cleaner, a gift, a status
symbol, a sales item, an expense, something to hold
a women's hair in a knot, etc. Although some uses
of a pen, may be more typical than others, the word
'lplay" does not seem to have a single most outstanding sense. When Neisser suggests we see
meanings, not stimuli or things, this would entail
that we see in a chair the possibility of our sitting
on it, moving it, stapling it, etc., or that we see in a
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With this terminology in place, differences in
constructions and perceptions between professional
designers as a community and individual users {or
others involved in the cycle of production and consumption) of artifacts become assailable and
questions about what a depersonalized object {as

0

seen by designers) may mean to particular users can
be answered. One could say, designers, like good
communicators, engage in discursive practices
through the articulation of artifacts whose meanings for particular users must also be afforded by
them else a user will approach his or her environment with expectations that are bound to fail
(Krippendorff, 1989). However, to state such a
relationship between affordances and meanings, as
in the previous sentence, requires a relativistic understanding of different individuals', understanding
including one's own. This relativity withdraws the
objectivity from Gibsons claims and makes the very
difference between affordances and meanings of

but) species to genera, tokens to types, objects to
categories, etc. It is the process by which we identifY what something is, to which category it belongs
which underlies the linguistic notion of connotation. It enables the naming of something not previously experienced by relating it to a familiar type.
Objectivists define categories in terms of what all
the instances of a category or the elements of a set
have in common.u This most naturally leads to
logical taxonomies of downwardly increasing
commonalties. The elaborate classification systems
of signs in semiotics provide ample examples of the
consequence of such a definition.

prime interest to a semantics for designers. It also

shifts the aim of design from creating aesthetic
forms of products to providing those affordances
that enable ordinary users to understand their
artifacts in their own way and to engage with them
in socially desirable practices (ultimately with the
designers as well).

Constructivist semantics relies instead on the
cognitive operations that invoke identifYing and
categorizing experiences. It defines categories not
by boundaries but by their center, often called
prototype, ideal type or type for short. The
evidence in favor of the latter is strong and has a
considerable history. There is Wittgenstein's
(1958) concept of family resemblance according to
which a category of things need not be represented
by what they all have in common but by the connectivity among its members. There is Chomsky's
argument that we cannot learn a language by being
exposed to all sentences of that language for we
construct new ones all the time and understand
even ungrammatical sentences with ease.
There is Rosh's (1978) work on prototypes suggesting that we can far easier express how close something is to what is most typical of a category, its
prototype, than to draw a boundary around all

Thus, a constructivist semantics must recognize
polysemy as a normal case, not as the undesirable
exception. It should look for meanings in the
multitude of contexts someone is capable of
constructing for something to make sense. It has to
relativise such meanings by taking into account
different positions, particularly comparing one's
own understanding with understanding of someone
else's understanding of what either may understand
quite differenrly. To reduce object-meaning
relationships to one-to-one correspondences or
codes, like purporting the lion to be a symbol of
protection, suppresses the very scope of understanding a constructivist semantics seeks to provide.

members.

Athavankar (1989, 1990) explored categorization
and prototype theory for design in which the identification of something is an important issue when
marketing an entirely new product or redesigning a
familiar artifact. The boundaries between a cup, a

Synedoche: types and tokens
Qften confused with metonymy, synecdoche reflects the
cognitive operation of relating (not parts to wholes
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Cognitive models are neither about nor representative of objects or systems of objects outside of us.
One can think of them as guiding particular social
practices we wish to engage in. These bring forth
experiences that inform the cognitive models in use
and thus dose a circle that constitutively involves
an - without these models unknowable environment. Within what such an environment
affords, cognitive models entail their own limitations. They work or remain viable as long as their
unfolding into social practices does not create
difficulties for themselves or end up in a
breakdown or trap.

mug and a bowl may be fuzzy but the ideal- (or
proto-) type is dear for any one user. Jochen Gros
once described the type of a category of artifacts as
its "Wesen 12 )) or essence.

Recently Johnson (1987) suggested that meaning
forms a category as well, connecting a multitude of
contexts that may have nothing in common other
than that the same thing links the different senses it
participates in into a single category, the category of
the artifact. One could argue that anything seen
always already is an artifact of cognition by virtue
of meaningful prototypes available for ir.

Cognitive models: schemas and
scripts

However, having said that understanding, our
cognitive models included, has no knowable
outside referent, we nevertheless can study the
cognitive models held by others in our own
understanding and compare them with our own
constructions of the practice they inform. This
seems possible because our ability to reason with
them and to express them in verbal discourse. For
example, Kempton (1987) carefully analyzed the
verbal accounts given by different users of thermostatic home heat control devices and could construct from them what seemed to be the guiding
conceptions of the practices he could observe.
Kempton found that individuals approached
thermostats either with the cognitive model of a
valve or with the cognitive model of a feedback
loop. Those guided by the valve model caused more
extreme temperature differences, had to reset the
thermostat more frequently and experienced more
frustrations than those guided by the feedback
model. The material system afforded both cognitive
models, of course, but brought forth rather different experiences for their beholders. The fact that
there are engineers who know the system they constructed does not enter the experiences of either
kind of users who saw no reason to change their
conceptions.

when we approach a new experience, we always bring
to it a repertoire of patterns for understanding,
structures that have guided the coordination of perception and action in the past, maps we have available to walk in similar terrain, scripts we are accustomed to follow, often without much thinking.
These phenomena may be captured here by a
single concept. To me, a cognitive model is a
recurrent pattern that recursively connects experiences
and maps then into tmderstandin&so that we may
reason with them. Let me elaborate.
Basic schemas, like cause and effect, map and
territory, sign and referent, text and context,
actor-action-targets and the semiotic triangle already are cognitive models, albeit simple and
general ones. These organize many experiences
semioticians have as evident in semiotic discourses.
What is important here is that cognitive models
are capable of organizing, reconstructing and
generating far more complex experiences than
these, from driving a car to understanding
how to move through a political system.
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The for practical purposes absence of correspond-

tutive principle of understanding. Mainstream
semiotics' self-imposed aim to describe the world in
terms of binary relationships as enshrined in the
semiotic triangle not only limits the complexity of
the phenomena it is led to tackle but also betrays
what probably motivated its originators, Charles S.
Peirce for example, to initiate the project, and this
is semiosis, the process by which signs come to be,
semiogenesis if you wish. Inquiries into relation~
ships presupposes they exist as such and looking for
codes makes one find them in the stabilities of a
world that resists variation. In this kind of semiotics, semiosis reduces to learning established signs,

ence criteria for evaluating cognitive models is most

striking in the design of user interfaces for computers. The interior of a computer is virtually incomprehensible to most competent users. Within the
extremely wide confines afforded by a computer,
users have the freedom to develop their own and
often rather weird conceptions of how the computer does what is experienced and in turn use those
conceptions that worked to generate experiences

that would follow from them. These conceptions
often come from entirely different domains of
experiences (see metaphors) and computer interface
designers may take advantage of cognitive models
in use to design operations that afford them. For
example, by affording opening and storing fLies,
discarding documents in a waste basket which have
little to do with what the computer does but much
with schemas of human understanding. Turkle
(1984) analyzed the cognitive models of computers
in children and traced their epigenesis to experiences with videogames, smart toys and human
interactions. Johnson (!987) looked for even mote
basic sources of schemas like inside-outside, updown, front-back, toward-away from, that are
thought to come from early bodily experiences, are
expressed in language and underly the construction
of many cognitive models for creating the world we
come to believe we live in.

adapting to existing conventions and institutions

and supporting the status quo. A theme that ran
through much of this paper is that cognition is
inherently restless. People's understanding not
merely adapts but creates social practices. There are
many realities, not one, and these are constantly
taken apart and constructed anew when we cognitively or discursively attend to them. Asserting
something, like producing an artifact, always changes the world we live in, albeit by small measures.
Nowhere is this more evident than in the already
mentioned world of modern personal computers.
Computers are general purpose machines to start
out with on which hardware designers impose a
simple architecture that users cannot change.
Beyond this, there is a whole industry that competitively provides software for malting computers
more understandable to users. Software links the
computer designers' understanding of how a system
works to users' understanding of the same. It is by
traditional definitions a mechanism of communication between the two, but of a qualitative new kind.
The critical feature of such a mechanisms is not to

The understanding of meaning is to a significant
degree informed by an understanding of the
cognitive models in use and discourse probably is
the best window into their cognitive constructions.
Cognitive models cannot be showed aside as
"mere" conceptual. They are demonstrably real.

as

lnteractivity: semiosis and involvement

influence, to control or to enforce a particular
behavior, but to enable users, senders or receivers, to

do something with and in terms of their very own
understanding.

a final point, I am suggesting that a constructivist semantics would have to embrace change as a consti-
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should be concerned with. Interactive practices of
deconstruction, reconstruction and designing social
realities in which participants understanding thrives
in cooperation with each other, creating institutional processes in which new realities are envision~
ed and put into praxis and the very effort of constructing a constructivist semantics for the design of
meaningful artifacts among others, product semantics for short, a semantics that brings forth the phenomena it claims to be about, these provide ample
examples of semiotic practices that could provide
their own metaphors of understanding.

By comparison, traditional machines essentially are
trivial in structure, embodying particular inputoutput relations.~' They are conceived as tools
whose specialized use has to be learned and perfected. They force users to adapt to them. The
motivation for their employment largely derives
from achieving certain goals outside of them to
which these machines are means. Personal com put-.
ers may be used as tools as well but, more importantly, they can be made to perform innumerable
tasks, are within an enormous range configurable
and can therefore be tailored by and in support of
human understanding. This makes them more
adapting to users' cognition than the other way
around. The motivation for their use comes less
from extrinsic achievement but from intrinsic
involvement in the process of unfolding ones
cognition in interactive practices. The more
natural it feels, the more self-directed one can move
and the more open to meaningful alternatives a
comPuter is, the more fun it is to interact if not
play with it. The evolution from word processors
to Macintosh windows to hyper-media applications
and to virtual realities is semiosis at its best.

Let me conclude with the quote from a magician of
our trade who, through his own "looking glass/'
may have anticipated much of what I was proposing here by having his characters engaged in this
dialogue:
"When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty
said, in rather a scornful tone
"it means just what I choose it to meanneither more nor less.))
'(The questipn is," said Alice, ,
"whether you can make words mean so
many different things."

Science always had an affinity to technology,
sometimes using it as a testbed for its theories and
sometimes talting from it models and metaphors for
constructing its theories. It seems that we have to
move away from the objectivist vocabulary of icons,
codes, causal chains and binary relations, away from
reprensentational and instrumental conceptions of
language and away from the search for accurate descriptions, predictions and control, all of which are
so clearly tied to trivial machine conceptions. The
artifactual world we now experience has grown far
beyond our traditional horizon of understanding.
We have to catch up to lead its ongoing semiosis.

"The question is," said Humpty Dumpty,
"which is to be master that's all."
(Lewis Carroll, 1982:184)
My answer would have to be found not in the
authority of a semiotician but in the constructions
we must create by ourselves to live in.

Klaus Krippendorff
Ph.D., is Professor of Communication
at the University of Pennsylvania,

Modern computers do not provide the only
metaphors for what a constructivist semantics
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Philadelphia, USA.
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- - ' - - - - - - - - - - - See a special issue of the Industrial Designers Society of America's
magazine, Innovations, 3, 2, 1984; a special double issue of Design Issues,
5, 2, 1989; the Proceedings from the Product Semantics '89 Conference,
Seppo Viikeva (ed.). Publication of the University of Industrial Arts UIAH,
A4, Helsinki, 1990.

2

For example Ernst von Glasersfeld's (1984) radical constructivism, Kenneth
Gergen's (1985) social constructionism, Peter Berger and Thomas
Luckmann's Social Construction of Reality (1967), George Lakoff (1987) and
Mark Johnson's ( 1987) cognitivism and various shades of naive
constructivisms ranging from George Kelly (1955) to Jesse Delia (1977).

_.=J__________ The difficulty of applying correspondence truth criteria also came to light
in a recent talk by Thomas Sebeok on "virtual reality," a computergenerated interactive world providing virtually real experiences to users.

He grounded the uncertainty regarding what reality is in conclusions rationally derived at by certain philosophers but then proceeded to
distinguish between vi.rtual realities, simulations and other forms of
representation as if an unqualified reality would knowably exist outside of
us, as if the uncertainty as to how reality is constituted could be ignored in
its representations. (See Proceedings of the 6th International Congress
on "Sign (Theory) in Practice", Passau, Germany, in press).
4

In a recent article, Helga Lannoch and Hans-JUrgen Lannoch (1989) recognize that the orthogonality of geometric space conceptions cannot accom-

modate human perception and developed instead a semantic notion of
space whose attributes are relative to the position of the observer within
this space.
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_ _:5.___________ An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 1690.
-~6c_,__________

6th International Congress "Sign(Theory) in Practice" Passau, Germany,
October 8-11, 1990. Proceedings forthcoming.

_ _,7___________ Helene Karmasln, "Mehrwert durch Zeichenwahl, Semiotik in der Analyse
von Marketing und Werbung", Plenary presentation to the above mentioned Congress, Wednesday I 0-10-90.
- - = - - - - - - - - - - - - Antje Flade, "Geschlechtsunterschied und Affordanz von Wohnungen", Paper presented to the above mentioned Congress, Section 5, Okologie und

Semiotik, Monday, I0-8-90.
- - ' - - - - - - - - - - - This formulation of understanding resembles that of autopoiesis which
Humberto Maturana discussed in numerous publications and at the above
mentioned Congress. This resemblance is no accident. Autopoiesis is an
explanation of living systems as a recursive network of interactions that

produces all the components necessary to continuously embody the very
process that produces them. As an explanation, autopoiesis is a recent

invention by Maturana and Varela ( 1980) and is not a requirement of
anyone's understanding. However, in seeking to understand the (social)
practices of others in terms of their understanding, since understanding
cannot exist outside of its embodyment (in a circular network of
perception and action constitutionally involving the biology of that other),
the maintenance of a biological organization through self-production,
which autopoiesis seeks to explain, is a prerequisite for understanding to
take place. In the long run, understanding cannot contradict the
autopoiesis of its embodyment.
----'1-"0_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Ibid.

-'-1'-1- - - - - - - - - See George Lakoff ( 1987) for a good discussion of this difference.
12

Jochen Gros, Form, sometimes before 1984.

13

For an elaboration of the trivial machine notion see H. von Foerster

( 1984).
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